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ABSTRACT

Six examples of "ad hoc" White House policy formation in higher education are presented, using records from the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson archives. The process by which the higher education proposals of six task forces and commissions were formulated and then reviewed is reconstructed. The groups examined include the 1946 Zook Commission, the 1956 Josephs Commission, the 1960 Hovde Task Force, and the 1966 Gardner-Howe Interagency Task Force. There were marked differences in the way that higher education advisory groups interpreted and executed their missions, the way in which they interfaced with executive branch policy-makers, and the way in which White House, Budget Bureau, and agency officials responded to "ad hoc" proposals for federal aid to college students and college institutions. It is concluded that the White House response to the recommendations of the higher education advisory groups was often at odds with Budget Bureau and agency responses. The Josephs and Hovde studies show that the presence/absence of White House support for a legislative program proposal was not always the determining factor in the enactment decision. In addition, the appointment of a commission or task force was not always a sign that the President wants to act on a given issue. An extensive bibliography is appended. (SW)

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# FROM TRUMAN TO JOHNSON
# SIX STUDIES OF AD HOC POLICY FORMULATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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From Truman to Johnson
Six Studies of Ad Hoc Policy Formulation in Higher Education

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As word spread that many of the New Frontier and Great Society programs of the 1960s had been engineered by special task forces, scholars began to realize how little of a reliable nature was known about the workings of the Presidential ad hoc advisory system. For political scientists, the Kennedy and Johnson episodes opened up the question of how ad hoc commissions and task forces function alongside the permanent cadre of Presidential advisors. For historians, the question became that of determining whether ad hoc groups have directly influenced the content of White House policy proposals over the years.

For the most part, both of these questions remain unanswered with respect to the dozen and a half education task forces and commissions appointed since World War II. While references to the work of many of these groups are common enough in discussions of the policy advances of the period 1946-68, only two task forces have been analyzed using the U.S. Presidents' archives. Even Norman C. Thomas, the leading student of task forces in education policy formulation,[1] has failed to consult White House records in his evaluation of some of the Johnson task forces. David Henry's discussion of the post-war commissions suffers the same flaw.[2] In short, and with the exception of Robert Hawkinson's unpublished dissertation on the 1964 Gardner and 1965 Keppel Task Forces,[3] what is known of these groups to date is derived entirely from hearsay, anonymous interviews, or external document review.

Using records found in the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson archives, this study reconstructs the process by which the higher education proposals of six task forces and commissions were formulated and then reviewed.

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This essay is condensed from a dissertation by the same title now in progress.

The groups examined include the 1946 Zook Commission, the 1956 Josephs Commission, the 1960 Hovde Task Force, the 1966 Gardner-Howe Interagency Task Force, the 1966 Friday Task Force, and the 1967 Gardner-Howe Interagency Task Force. As the discussion will show, there were marked differences in the way which the higher education advisory groups interpreted and executed their missions, the way in which they "interfaced" with Executive Branch policy-makers, and the way in which White House, Budget Bureau, and agency officials responded to ad hoc proposals for federal aid to college students and college institutions.

## The 1946 Commission on Higher Education

Plans for the Zook Commission coincided with rumblings from the academic community over the plight of the nation's colleges. Academic concern, however, was not matched by public concern until several waves of veterans had come and gone across college campuses. Like the President,[1] the public was more interested in tackling the teacher and classroom shortages in elementary and secondary schools in early 1946 than in diverting federal resources to higher education.

Why, then, was a commission on nigher education created? The answer seems to lie in a mixture of private hopes and private politics brewing within the White House. The idea for the Commission appears to have originated with Donald Kingsley and his assistant, John Thurston,[2] both of whom worked under John Steelman when he was Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion and afterward when he became Assistant to the President. Kingsley, a former professor at Antioch and Steelman's chief staff person for manpower, had an abiding interest in higher education. Thurston had been a student of Kingsley's. As the war period came to an end, Kingsley and his staff began discussing post-war educational needs. The commission idea was borne of these discussions and then presented to Steelman for his reaction.

The proposal came at a time when Steelman, the conservative among Truman's close advisors, found himself jockeying to retain his position of influence in the face of efforts, spearheaded by Special Counsel Clark Clifford, to bring the President around to a "strong and consistent liberal position" in

domestic affairs.[4] Perhaps feeling pressure to appeal to Truman's liberal ideology while appeasing his fiscal conservatism,[5] Steelman welcomed the commission suggestion. He is thought to have supervised its presentation to the President as "closely" as he could -- a move probably inspired by the "intense competition" Clifford represented.[6]

Kingsley and Thurston handled the selection of commission members. Sensitive to the public nature of the body, they carefully evaluated the contribution each nominee might make toward achieving a commission representative of the "major currents in educational thinking and leadership" and evenly distributed along geographical, institutional, political, and religious lines.[7] After checking names out with the Office of Education and Kingsley's own contacts in the field, Kingsley sent the membership list to Steelman for his approval.[8]

Kingsley's conscientious efforts were met, for the most part, by warm praise when the membership was announced. However, the White House did not escape chastisement for sins of commission and omission. The naming of Agnes Meyer, well-known for her stand against Catholic education politics, brought a flood of demands for her removal, including one from Justice Thomas Cuff of the New York Supreme Court. The appointment of the AFL's Mark Starr incensed the unrepresented CIO. Other complaints came from those upset at the seating of only one Negro.[9]

Of those asked to serve, only Harold Dodds, President of Princeton (and later a critic of the Commission), declined. After six months of service, Eleanor Roosevelt withdrew, stating that she "found it . . . impossible to give adequate time" to the work of the Commission.[10] Her letter of resignation to the President also expressed concern at allegations by the National Education Association that the Commission was giving "too little thought" to public education.

These charges can be traced directly to the NEA's Ralph McDonald. In no uncertain terms, McDonald threatened the White House with an NEA-wide revolt if Chariman George Zook and Executive Secretary Francis Brown, both of the American Council on Education, were not unseated.[11] Despite several White House attempts to "calm McDonald down,"[12] he persisted in arguing that the presence of Zook and Brown on the Commission would ensure "the

domination of the private and sectarian point of view." A close look at the Commission's make-up (evenly divided between public and private education representatives) and its final report, however, prove McDonald's fears to have been unfounded. As Thurston and Commission member Earl McGrath have interpreted this embarrassing episode, McDonald's reaction was less a response to the appointment of Zook and Brown than a response to the fact that he was not among the chosen.[13]

As is customary upon appointment to a public commission, each of the Zook Committee members received a letter from the President describing the Commission's mission. Though signed by Truman, the letter was drafted by Kingsley and thus represented the latter's judgment as to the issues the Commission should consider.[14] As soon as the Commission assembled in Washington for its first meeting, it freely revised this list of issues, pruning limbs off and grafting others on as it saw fit. Kingsley, who had privately declared to Steelman his intention to "ride herd over the Commission,"[15] apparently accepted these revisions without question.

When the Commission finished negotiating its agenda, the process of collecting data began. Thurston and Brown supervised this tedious search, soliciting information as well as policy recommendations from private and government agencies.[16] Like most large advisory panels, the group divided itself into subcommittees, which met independently to digest outside documents and to hammer out positions before submitting them for debate at plenary sessions.[17] Between these meetings in Washington, members conferred over the phone and in letters.

Records of the subcommittee meetings are sparse, but those relating to the subcommittee on educational opportunity show that this topic was clearly among those over which the Commission labored long and hard. After eight months of soul-searching, the subcommittee could not yet see its way around the problems of segregation and discrimination in higher education.[18] The crux of the dilemna, as revealed in a letter from Horace Kallen to his subcommittee fellows,[19] was how far the Commission should go in proposing possible remedies for discriminatory and segregationist practices. The Commission had examined several options, none of which was wholly satisfactory. Withholding federal subventions from institutions engaging in

such practices would fail to change the status quo, would penalize Negro colleges, and would never pass Congress. Creating national universities, independent of "political manipulation," would give Negroes the chance to attend integrated institutions of a high quality but would not put an end to discrimination in other institutions. Federal scholarships, which the Commission ultimately endorsed but which Kallen felt to be "an evasion and postponement of the issue," could make a stab at promoting educational opportunity but fell far short of providing incentives to institutions to change.

While the Commission continued to agonize over the opportunity problem, its other subcommittees were at work developing a general policy statement (Volume I of the final report), recommendations for reorganizing higher education to include statewide systems of tuition-free community colleges and to coordinate various institutional missions (Volume III), proposals for improving the quantity and quality of college faculty (Volume IV), and proposals for federal role in financing one-third of the capital outlay needed to expand the public sector (Volume V). Like the subcommittee on educational opportunity, the subcommittee on financing higher education found itself caught on the horns of a dilemna. Some members representing private and sectarian colleges recoiled at the prospect of limiting federal institutional aid to public colleges. As Zook wrote to Steelman in a progress report dated April 4, 1947, it was ten months before the subcommittee had "ironed out most of the controversial issues involved."[20]

During the last several months of the Commission's life, prominent newspapers carried articles and editorials discussing the college "crisis" that had erupted as a result of overcrowding from veterans and the social crisis that would erupt as a result of scientific and professional manpower shortages. The appointment of the Zook Commission and the report of the President's Scientific Manpower and Research advisory committee appears to have emboldened discussion of these problems among the public and the higher education community, raising concern to a near fever pitch.

The White House took notice of this change in public temper in early January of 1947, and debated whether to send Congress a special message on education that winter or to wait until the publication of the Zook report

later in the year.[21] Federal Security Agency Administrator Watson B. Miller advised the President to go ahead with a message. Miller argued that the time was "ripe" and that a message now rather than later would capitalize on public sentiment. For reasons unclear, however, the White House decided against it.

Eighteen months later (and six months after the Zook report had been published), there were no ready signs that the White House was planning to respond to the higher education crisis. Impatient with the lack of Presidential initiative, Budget Director Frank Pace pressed Truman to instruct Oscar Ewing (Miller's successor) to prepare a program for legislative clearance and presentation to the 81st Congress.[22] Thus prompted, Truman asked Ewing in September of 1948 to submit an outline of the "principles" he would follow in developing a legislative program.

Even before receiving official go-ahead from the President, the Office of Education, then housed in the Federal Security Agency, had started reviewing the Zook proposals for federal scholarships and fellowships.[23] At the request of the White House, the OE also make an in-depth study of the Commission's community college recommendations and concluded that the President should appropriate funds to assist the States in exploring the creation of community college systems.[24] By and large, however, the Administration focused its attention on ways to assist college students. From mid-1948 through 1949, the new Commissioner of Education, Earl McGrath, and the Director of the OE's Division of Higher Education, John Dale Russell, took readings among higher education groups[25] while White House, BOB, and FSA/OE staff negotiated provisions of a student aid bill.[26] The bill, crafted along lines almost identical to the Commission's proposal, was to be submitted to Congress in early 1950.

The Commission had envisioned a federal program of undergraduate scholarships of up to $800 per year to aid 300,000 students and graduate fellowships of $1,500 per year. The program was to be administered by State commissions acting as federal agents. The State commissions would determine an applicant's eligibility and make awards to be used at the institution of the recipient's choice, public, private, in-state, or out-of-state. The Administration weighed this option against a matching

grants program to the States of similar proportions, which would be administered under State control. As a supplement to federal scholarships or grants, a loan program was also proposed. The grants option, advocated by Assistant to the President David Stowe, would assist more students with given federal expenditures but would limit recipients to in-state schools -- a clear disadvantage to Negro students in segregated systems. The BOB-preferred scholarship option, which would require greater federal expenditures for a given number of students, had the advantages of being more acceptable to private higher education and permitting more freedom of choice to recipients.

Stowe argued against using loans even as a supplement to grants or scholarships. The OE likewise found little reason to embrace the program. But after dogged persistence by Oscar Ewing, who proposed the loan provision, the BOB asked the OE to redraft the bill to include loans as part of a three-pronged program of scholarships, loans, and fellowships. The BOB also asked Buell Gallagher and Fred Kelly of the OE to reconsider the justification for the fellowship program. In light of existing Public Health fellowships and those which the pending National Science Foundation bill would provide, a general fellowship program might invite "duplication and competition."

Because questions relating to all three provisions had yet to be settled by late December of 1949, John Thurston, now Acting FSA Administrator, and Frank Pace, Elmer Staats, and Weldon Jones, all of the BOB, agreed that any language on higher education in the President's upcoming budget message should be "very general." But unresolved details of the student aid bill's provisions were hardly the whole reason for deciding that the budget message language should be vague. The memo recording this agreement also noted that the President was worried that a higher education bill would have "adverse implications . . . upon general aid to education." Presumably, this was the reason why the higher education bill was not sent to Congress until August of 1950, even though it was ready in April.

The student aid bill, modelled on the Commission's proposals for scholarships and fellowships but also containing loans, fared no better

than the Administration's third attempt to pass an elementary and secondary education bill. Rufus Miles, who worked with Elmer Staats and Weldon Jones in the Budget office, has observed that the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 definitely dimmed the student aid bill's prospects for passage.[27] But to this observation John Thurston has added that neither the White House nor the Budget Bureau, acting on the President's behalf, "made any strenuous effort to have the aid bill pressed in the Congress."[28] Thus while the Zook Commission was successful in convincing top Administration officials of the need for federal student aid, it fell short of changing Truman's lukewarm attitude toward the idea. As one may by now suspect, the Commission was as much intended to educate the President as it was intended to educate the public.

## The 1956 Josephs Commission

A copy of "suggested remarks" for the President's use at the first meeting of the Josephs Committee reveals that the Administration's objectives for this commission differed from those Truman had approved for the Zook Commission.[1] Whereas the Zook Commission had been instructed to examine problems relating to the traditional functions of higher education, those outlined for the Josephs Committee had a distinct national security flavor to them. Of the four items suggested to Eisenhower for discussion, three dealt directly or indirectly with America's defense: the need to fill manpower shortages in the sciences and other professions, the need to accommodate "rapidly changing technology," and the "national security" implications of scientific research and humanistic studies. Only the fourth item, the need to overcome housing and teacher deficiencies, can be said to have reflected what college spokesmen themselves might have asked the Committee to consider.

Given this set of "operating assumptions," it is not surprising that the composition of the Josephs Committee also represented a departure from the 1946 precedent. The Zook Commission was overwhelmingly comprised of persons with direct ties to the academic community, and its chairman was President of the chief umbrella group representing higher education interests. By contrast, only half of the thirty-five members of the Josephs

Committee had ties to individual colleges or state boards of higher education; the other half of the membership was recruited from major businesses and industries, elementary and secondary school boards, labor, and politics. The Administration's two choices for the chairmanship, Roy Larsen and Devereux Josephs, were both from the business sector. While selecting members for the Committee both HEW Secretary Marion Folsom and the Assistant to the President Sherman Adams had agreed that members should be "politically non-partisan."[2] But the virtual absence of Jews, the small number of Southerners, and the heavy representation of big business on the commission betray an attempt to ensure that the Committee would not run afoul of the President's disposition against federal aid to higher education.

Like the Zook Commission, however, the Committee immediately set about adjusting its agenda to reflect its own sense of the issues that warranted consideration. By the end of its second meeting, it had expanded its list to include many of the same issues that appeared in the Zook report. Among these were enlarging and diversifying educational opportunity (an issue noticeably absent in the President's "suggested remarks"), meeting physical requirements to accommodate six to seven million students by 1970, financing higher education for so many students, supplying qualified college teachers, and meeting manpower needs of science, industry, and government. Omitted from the agenda was consideration of the "national security aspects" of study in the sciences and humanities.[3]

In November of 1956, the Committee sent a short interim report to the President foreshadowing its priorities and positions on the questions raised during the first six months of deliberations.[4] Though the report shied away from making specific recommendations at this juncture, it did call for immediate "State by State analyses" of higher education needs and the projected costs of meeting these needs. A month later, at a meeting of legislative leaders at the White House, Secretary Folsom announced that he wanted funds and authorization to proceed with the recommended survey. Republican Congressional leaders balked at the idea, warning that such a program would be an "opening wedge for heavy federal involvement in college education." The President, however, sided with the Secretary, stating that "planning for the future had to be undertaken quickly."[5]

In the late spring of 1957, the Commission finished its second interim report, which, like the first, was intended for public circulation. Josephs scheduled release of the report for June 28th. He also asked the President to write a cover letter for the report to be sent to all State Governors pointing out the need for State and local action on some of the problems identified therein. Josephs's hope was to have the States and localities respond to the report in time for the Committee's final conclusions.[6] The White House, however, did not take kindly to Josephs's request or to sections of the second report itself. Writing to Staff Secretary Andrew Goodpastor, Deputy Assistant for Inter-governmental Relations Howard Pyle recommended against releasing the report before the end of July and against a transmittal letter "from anyone in the White House" to the Governors.[7] He also urged that the report be released under the Committee's auspices, rather than under White House auspices as Josephs had apparently wished. Behind these cautions was the belief that the report contained "material for attacks on the pending school construction legislation." Pyle noted that "damaging arguments" on a number of "major policy matters" were to be found throughout the report -- and that a White House transmittal or release would be widely regarded as an "implied endorsement" by the President.

White House displeasure at the damaging sections of the report is also witnessed by the dilution of a letter, acknowledging receipt of the report, composed by Folsom for the President's signature.[8] Undoubtedly reflecting more of his own attitude than that of the President, Folsom warmly embraced the work of the Committee and specifically endorsed its emphasis on extending educational opportunities and the need for "cooperative endeavors at all levels of Government" to achieve this goal. Folsom also stated that he had instructed a "Departmental task force" to follow up on the report "in order that there may be brought to the problems . . . the best possible thought and action of Federal personnel concerned with education." After a week of work by the White House staff to correct Folsom's deviations "from the noncommittal basis" suggested by General Person's office, a cut and dried letter omitting the citations above was signed by the President and sent on to Josephs.

If the second interim report found few takers at the White House, the third and final report of October 1957 apparently found even fewer, for it

was never released. The copy Josephs sent to the President on October 21st with an obullient cover letter was separated from the letter and not deposited in the White House Central Files.[9] How far the final report departed from the second report is not wholly ascertainable; but a fairly good, if indirect, record of its tenor and recommendations is contained in a three-page critique of the report which Folsom wrote and sent to the President on October 23rd.[10]

The Committee identified as most pressing the following priorities: improving faculty salaries, expanding graduate education to improve and increase the supply of college teachers, expanding educational opportunity and sources of student financial aid, and expanding college facilities. It recommended federal aid in the following forms: continuing low-interest rate loans for income producing facilities, a matching grants program modelled on the Hill-Burton Act for the construction of other facilities, full overhead payment on federally-sponsored reserach, work-study scholarships, and greater income tax deductions to encourage private benefactors to create scholarship funds. Folsom agreed with most of these priorities and recommendations, except the Committee's failure to recommend a more substantial program of federal aid to students. Its preference for a "bricks and mortar" approach to federal involvement Folsom found to be somewhat inconsistent with the report's emphasis on expanding educational opportunity. He would have preferred a frontal attack on this problem (in addition to construction and other programs), rather than reserving, as the Committee had suggested, massive federal student aid as an option to be exercised after other alternatives had been given "a fair trial." However, Folsom was quick to point out to the President "that the Committee believed that substantial Federal aid ultimately will be required" on all fronts and that the Committee had "strongly emphasize/d/ /the/ need for Federal leadership -- pointing out that higher education is 'local in fact and national in its consequences.'"

Folsom also expressed some Departmental "disappointment in the overly logistical approach" of the Committee; i.e., its failure to take note of the fact that higher education has "become essential to economic and military strength and to ideological warfare." (The Department had just concluded

a study of the use of education in communist countries for such warfare.) Folsom concluded his analysis by stating that while the Administration should avoid Congressional pressures "to adopt /a/ crash program in higher education," neither "must it be shortsighted in doing what needs to be done." To this end, he told the President that the departmental task force (chaired by Commissioner of Education Lawrence Derthick) would deliver its proposed program "based on our analysis of the Report" before "the end of the year."

Two weeks later, and accompanied by task force members Elliott Richardson, John Perkins, and Derthick, Folsom met with the President to confirm views as to what education priorities should be set for 1958.[11] Now armed with the President's explicit consent for a program in keeping with the "public mood," Folsom next presented a general outline of an "Educational Development Act," [12] at the November 15th meeting of the Cabinet.[13] Stating first that "much further consultation was needed in and out of Government," he described plans for a program broader than but also incorporating several of the major proposals of the Josephs Committee. The most significant differences between the Committee's and the task force's proposals were programs for undergraduate scholarships, incentives for foreign language teaching, and construction grants for technical and scientific training facilities. Some sentiment was expressed at the meeting for limiting scholarships "to fields . . . essential to our national security" and for leaving the provision of scholarships entirely to the private sector. But the President and others countered that there was "a pressing need for some Federal money" on a temporary basis.

Discussion of these plans carried over to the December 2nd Cabinet meeting.[14] Though the President's science advisor, James Killian, applauded Folsom's efforts to develop a well-rounded program, one "not confined merely to science," Eisenhower worried that the program was too broad and "might not remedy to lag in science and mathematics" or sufficiently address the need to encourage higher pay for teachers. The President was called out of the meeting at this point, and attention returned to the more fundamental issue of whether the program would "leave room for maximum effort and control by the States." Similar questions were raised at a White House meeting of

Republican legislative leaders two days later,[15] with the President voicing support for restricting scholarships, though not teacher training, to national defense fields. Except for this point of disagreement, Eishenhower commended the program to the Congressmen as "something developed by the most capable groups in the country" -- a comment made on the heels of Folsom's observation that there were "indications that the Congress would want something much more radical."

In the meanwhile, the Budget Bureau had started review of the program's cost estimates as well as review of a proposal to add $140 million to the college housing loan authority,[16] an item urged by the Committee. By late December a near final explanation of the Folsom program had been placed in the President's hands.[17] Eisenhower then asked his brother, Milton Eisenhower (who had served on the Zook Commission and was then President of Johns Hopkins) to do a confidential critique of the program.

The critique turned out to be a lengthy, hortatory document, which, while hardly adverse to the general thrust of the program, recommended several modifications.[18] For one, Eisenhower felt that Folsom's 10,000 scholarships ought to be doubled or trebled, with the difference in cost made up by dropping the matching grant proposals for testing and counseling services to high school students and the recruiting of science and math teachers at higher salaries. Neither of these suggestions, however, were adopted in the bill sent to Congress. Eisenhower also argued that fellowships should be offered to those interested in secondary as well as college teaching, but, again, the Administration decided to keep the original provision intact. Though not recommending any specific change, Eisenhower questioned the practicality of trying to distinguish between undergraduate and graduate facilities if federal funds were to be limited to the latter. In practice, he observed, facilities are used for both. The bill sent to Congress nonetheless maintained the distinction. All in all, he concluded, "politically, it seems desirable for the Administration to sponsor a bold and sizeable program."

Milton Eisenhower's review of the Folsom program signalled the final phase of White House tinkering with it; major changes thereafter were left to the Congress. The end product of nine months of deliberation, beginning

in the early summer with the completion of the Josephs Committee second report and an OE study on student financial aid alternatives,[19] was an Administration bill incorporating some of the ideas endorsed by the Committee and many of the ideas generated by Folsom and his follow-up task force. It is clear in all this that Folsom, with the help of accelerating public and Congressional support for action, was the major force behind the development of the bill, both before and after the launching of Sputnik.

With Folsom duly credited for his part, some specific observations are in order with respect to the contribution of the Committee itself. First, the Committee's recommendations for expanding graduate education, increasing the supply of college teachers, providing counseling and testing for high school students, and strengthening the analytical capacities of the Office of Education were included in the Administration's version of the NDEA bill. Of these proposals, only aid to graduate schools was eliminated after the bill was sent to Congress.

Its recommendation to continue low-interest federal loans under the college housing program was also heeded. The Committee argued the case for a Hill-Burton type of program for the construction of college facilities. In 1960, the Administration proposed a debt-retirement program for the same purpose but was rebuffed.[20] In 1963, however, the proposal came to have force of law in the Higher Education Facilities Act, and in 1964, its proposal to revive the work-study program of the Depression years was included in the Economic Opportunity Act. The only major proposal of the Josephs Committee to be overturned was its recommendation to hold-off on federal aid to college students -- but even here, the Committee acknowledged that substantial federal aid on this count would be necessary.

In light of this record of specific accomplishments, and in light of the fuel that the Josephs report added to Folsom's fire, the fact that the Committee's priorities were inverted by the Eisenhower Administration[21] is a matter of little consequence.

## The 1960 Hovde Task Force

Unlike the Truman and Eisenhower commissions, the Kennedy Task Force on Education was not created to wrestle with the fundamental question of whether the federal government ought to change its posture toward higher education. For the Hovde Task Force, this question had already been answered in the affirmative, first by way of the steps toward change embodied in the NDEA and then by the 1960 Democratic campaign platform.

The purpose of the Kennedy Education Task Force, and of all the other Task Forces appointed immediately following the 1960 election, was to develop specific legislative proposals for inclusion in the President-elect's first Message to Congress. As advisor Richard Neustadt wrote to Kennedy just days before the election, the transition task forces were to do the "preliminary work of screening ideas, sharpening issues, posing choices, and then actually turning out draft-action documents."[1] Theodore Sorensen, soon to be Kennedy's Special Counsel, supervised the selection of task force members, drawing about one-hundred names from the professions, foundations, and universities, all of which were "considered to have some talent or some political claim or, as in most cases, both."[2] The name of Purdue University President Frederick Hovde, who had served on the Josephs Commission, was among this group. Along with Francis Keppel, Dean of the Harvard School of Education, Benjamin Willis, Superintendent of Chicago's public schools, Russell Thackery of the Land Grant Colleges Association, Alvin Eurich, Vice President of the Ford Foundation, and John Gardner, President of the Carnegie Foundation, Hovde was asked to prepare a report for the Kennedy staff's use in developing elementary, secondary, and higher education programs.

Within weeks of receiving its marching orders, the Task Force had identified "legislative and administrative proposals of the highest priority" after sifting through "more than sixty legislative proposals put forward" in the past several years.[3] The Task Force's first priority was to provide aid to public elementary and secondary schools in the form of general per pupil aid and additional per pupil aid for low-income States and large cities. Its centerpiece higher education proposal was a five-year, $500 million program of federal matching grants and low-interest loans

for the construction and remodelling of academic facilities at private and public colleges and non-profit technical institutes. Of the federal funds to be allocated, 70% would go to matching grants and 30% to loans. Administration of the program would be similar to the Hill-Burton Act. A program combining loans and grants, the Task Force noted in an appendix only for Presidential staff use, would "have the very substantial support of the academic community."[4] The Task Force also urged the President-elect to increase the college housing loan authority by $150 million until June of 1961 and thereafter by $350 million per year through 1964.

After examining the NDEA, the Hovde group concluded that it warranted "strengthening," beginning with a five-year extension of the Act. To expand educational opportunities the Task Force recommended a number of changes: increasing student loan funds, initiating a program of federally-guaranteed private loans, and removing the yearly ceiling on federal capital contributions to individual institutions. Major changes in federal fellowships included extending fellowships to those planning to teach in elementary or secondary schools, increasing annual fellowships to a fixed payment of $2,500, and funding more fellows to meet "the acute shortage of college teachers." Most of the other recommendations of the Task Force for the NDEA amounted to fine-tuning.

The transition task forces reported to the President-elect in late December and early January. After initial review by Sorensen, Hans Adler, Richard Goodwin, Myer Feldman, and David Bell, the reports were turned over to the newly designated Cabinet and agency heads for a second round of discussion.[5] The Hovde report was handed to Wilbur Cohen, Kennedy's choice for Assistant Secretary of HEW, along with instructions from Sorensen to begin preparing education legislation. Francis Keppel, now tapped for the post of Commissioner of Education, was to assist Cohen.[6]

Sorensen once described Kennedy's "private judment" of the task reports as ranging from "helpful" to "terrific."[7] What Kennedy thought of the Hovde report in particular is not certain; however, there are a number of reasons for believing that the President-elect's reaction was mixed. First, Cohen states that Kennedy was disturbed at the cool -- and in Catholic quarters cold -- reaction to the report when it was released (without appendices)

in late January of 1961. In addition to Catholic criticism of the report's failure to recommend aid to private elementary and secondary education, hackles were raised at the report's projection that it would take $9 billion to implement all of the programs it recommended. The "undue" emphasis given to the programs' price tag frustrated th President, who felt attention should properly have been focused on the merits of the Hovde proposals.[8] Second, the report was at odds with the 1960 Democratic platform's promise of scholarships for college students, a cornerstone of its pledge to increase educational opportunity. The Task Force recommended more loans under the NDEA and a program of federally-guaranteed private loans, which, while not at cross-purposes with Kennedy's campaign commitment, certainly fell short of the candidate's stated goals. Third, Cohen and others assigned to develop the 1961 program were, evidently, not instructed to follow the Task Force recommendations stroke for stroke. The Hovde report was but one of several sources consulted by Cohen and Keppel.[9] Others, no doubt, included papers issued by education associations and memos issued during the transition by the BOB on items of interest to the incoming Administration.[10] In short, The Administration was simply not wedded to the Hovde report.

The Administration's first year proposals to Congress on higher education bear this observation out.[11] Despite the Task Force's pledge of support by higher education groups for a program of grants and loans to construct non-income producing facilities, Kennedy asked only for loans -- thought not without giving consideration to the Constitutionality of a grant program that would include sectarian colleges.[12] He did, however, include in his request a trimmed down verson of the Hovde plan for increasing authorizations to the college housing loan program.

True to his campaign promise, but contrary to the Task Force's thinking on the subject, the President proposed a scholarship program, accompanied by cost of education allowances to institutions, as an amendment to the student loan title of the NDEA. Though neither this nor other amendments to the NDEA proposed by the Administration in 1961 were to survive House and Senate scrutiny, it is important to note that most of the Administration's changes to this Act were consistent with those recommended by the Task Force. Task Force proposals adopted by Cohen, approved by Kennedy,

and sent to the Congress are too numerous to list here, but some of the major NDEA changes included establishing a permanent and expanded student loan fund, liberalizing loan forgiveness features, raising the annual ceiling on federal capital contributions, and increasing both the annual number of and annual payment to graduate fellows.[13]

There is some evidence to suggest that as it became clear in the late summer of 1961 that Congress would not accept a college construction bill without grants, the Administration toyed with the idea of submitting "a new package on education," a package that incorporated loans and grants. A program outline dated August 3rd and a memo from Sorensen to the President dated August 15th show tentative plans for introducing a three-titled bill to aid impacted areas, build public schools, and provide loans and grants for the construction of academic facilities.[14] However, rather than redoubling its own efforts that fall, the Administration allowed Congresswoman Edith Green to take up the construction issue in a separate bill as soon as her colleagues reconvened in 1962.[15] Green's bill for loans and grants also included the Administration's renewed request for scholarships, but, as in 1961, the higher education bill foundered.

Several of the Hovde Task Force recommendations were to resurface in 1963 during the formulation of the Administration's "omnibus" bill.[16] Scholarships were retired and in their place appeared the Hovde proposals for expanding the NDEA loan program and for a new federally-insured student loan program. Graduate fellowships were to be increased dramatically to 10,000 a year, a scale even larger than that envisioned by the Task Force. Project grants to colleges for elementary and secondary teacher training programs were to be introduced under a title that contained a series of other measures for improving the quality of education. However, the essence of the Task Force's recommendation for construction of academic facilities was lost: while loans would be broadly available, grants would be limited to building and equipping facilities for technical and scientific education. Only the community colleges would have unrestricted access to construction grants.

How the President's 1963 omnibus bill was to be tactically altered and then artfully navigated through the Congress to produce the Higher

Education Facilities Act is a story well told by Sundquist[17] and need not be repeated here. Of importance to this analysis is that after a series of advances and retreats, the Administration was to embrace many of the Hovde Task Force's recommendations for aid to students and colleges. This is not to say that this happened exclusively as a result of the strength of the Hovde proposals or that the Administration consulted the Hovde report throughout its attempts to find a program acceptable to Congress and interest groups. To assume so would be naive. Furthermore, the Task Force's proposals, taken as a whole, were hardly inventions -- many of them had been circulating in and out of other hands for years. But one undiluted fact remains, and it is on this that a case for the Task Force's success as a device of policy formulation rests: the Task Force correctly identified higher education proposals that were marketable under the circumstances and threw its weight behind them.

## The 1966 Gardner-Howe Interagency Task Force

The 1963 Higher Education Act secured long sought-after programs of scholarships and federally-subsidized student loans. It was in the heady atmosphere following its passage that the agenda for the 1966 Interagency Task Force on Education was formulated. Well before the Task Force was formally appointed in September of 1966, James Gaither, right-hand man to the President's Special Assistant Joseph Califano, had begun compiling ideas for the 1967 domestic legislative program. Most of the ideas in the education section of Gaither's program binder[1] had been generated in informal discussions between White House aides, BOB staff, John Gardner, Secretary of HEW, and Harold Howe II, Commissioner of Education. After surveying the federal higher education landscape and finding that support for construction and students "is particularly well-covered," Gardner and the BOB concluded that new directions were in order. What was now needed was "a comprehensive plan and strategy for Federal support" and, in particular, support for "categories of institutions . . . which educate the bulk of our students," support for "the teaching function," and encouragement "of innovation and experimentation" in curricula and institutional development. One other "new departure" was identified as well: expanding educational opportunity for middle-income groups.

The Task Force's agenda had thus begun to gel by the time Califano formally charged Gardner with developing a report. Accompanying Califano's enabling memo was an abbreviated list of the ideas in Gaither's binder.[2] The list appeared again at the Task Force's first White House meeting on September 21st.[3] While Califano made clear that the Task Force was not to be limited to examining these proposals, the list made clear where White House interests -- and therefore Task Force priorities -- lay.

At Gardner's request, Commissioner Howe assumed supervisory responsibility for the Task Force. By early October, Howe reported to Califano that the Task Force had developed "tentative papers" along the lines suggested in the enabling memo,[4] presumably referring to annotated outlines of four proposed acts[5] the Task Force had drafted. These included an "Education Manpower Act" (the foundation of the Educations Professions Development Act of 1967); an "Equal Educational Opportunity Act," which incorporated proposed changes to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and added a title for adult education programs; vocational education amendments; and a "Higher Education Development Act" that embodied many of the ideas discussed by Gardner et al earlier in the year. Title I of this Act would provide grants to colleges for innovative academic programs. Title II would match institutional funds to introduce computers in college instruction. Title III would aid "emerging graduate schools." Title IV would raise the quality of undergraduate and graduate teacher training programs.

Califano had given Gardner and Howe a reporting deadline of October 31st, which the Task Force dutifully met. In the weeks between the September meeting at the White House and completion of the report, Califano continued to pass ideas along for the Task Force's consideration.[6] Howe responded in kind by keeping Califano abreast of the group's decisions to add, delete, or delay consideration of particular issues.[7] During this same period, the proposed Higher Education Development Act, with its duke's mixture of programs, was over-hauled to focus more upon undergraduate teaching.[8] The Task Force dropped the emerging graduate schools provision "because it would tend to encourage proliferation of lower quality graduate programs," and transferred the teacher training title to the Education

Professions Development Act. The original title aimed at curricular innovations took on ambitious proportions, with a shift in emphasis from curriculum development to faculty development. All institutions above the "developing colleges" category (a category of institutions singled out for federal aid in the Higher Education Act of 1965) would be eligible for planning and project grants to upgrade and expand undergraduate teaching staff and to design and implement undergraduate curricular improvements.

In addition to these titles, the Task Force recommended another to establish up to twenty regional research and development centers for higher education, paralleling the education laboratories authorized under the ESEA. To support teaching and scholarship in the arts and humanities, the Task Force proposed institutional support grants and construction grants for special purpose facilities, both to be administered by the under-funded National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. Only the computers title of the earlier draft was left unchanged. The now called "Higher Education Quality Act" was now estimated at $267 million for FY '68.

For reasons unclear, the Task Force submitted its report without indicating which among its broad range of proposals for elementary, secondary, vocational, adult, and higher education[9] should be accorded top priority in 1967. In his memo transmitting the report, Howe told Califano that he and Gardner had discussed the recommendations and that Gardner would convey his "priorities and qualifications" shortly.[10] Whether the undated list of priorities that appears in both Gaither's and Ervin Duggan's task force files[11] represents the views of Gardner alone or in concert with others is open to question. But there is no question that the list's author(s) believed that higher education was of lower legislative importance in 1967 than other education needs addressed by the Task Force. Of the Task Force's nine major programs, higher education ranked below innovation in vocational education, adult literacy, grants to the States elementary and secondary educational planning, improvement of the Teachers Corps, and educational TV and ahead of Education Professions Development, improvement of economics education, and aid to rural students. How, why, and exactly when this relative ordering came about cannot be readily determined, but none of the nine programs was eliminated before detailed discussion by all parties to the White House review process.

As was customary upon White House receipt of a task force report, the

BOB would independently review recommendations before they were jointly reviewed by White House aides, BOB staff, and key agency and departmental heads. William Cannon, chief of the Education, Manpower, and Science Division, conducted the budget analysis of the 1966 education report.[12] While Cannon did not flatly state that the 1968 budget could not accommodate most of the new directions recommended by the Task Force, he clearly implied that such was the case. Pointing out that new education legislation and amendments to existing legislation would total "$1.8 billion in 1968, rising to about $5 billion by 1972," he advised Budget Director Schultze that "planning in general . . . should be the principal theme for 1968 . . . . /and/ that major new program thrusts /sh/ould be deferred, although some 'pilot' programming may be warranted." As far as the proposed Higher Education Quality Act was concerned, Cannon concluded that the Task Force had done "alot of good analytic work . . . on the general dimensions" of higher education problems but had done "poorly on some specific proposals." These latter included the computers proposal, which, he noted, offered "absolutely no" supporting analysis and the undergraduate teaching proposal, which, even if scaled down to provide only planning grants, would "be an open invitation to pressures for large-scale program support in future years."

With Cannon's cautions in hand, Califano convened a series of White House meetings with the Task Force, beginning in early November and ending in mid-December,[13] to decide which proposals would go and which would stay. Notes taken over the course of these meetings (apparently by Gaither) show almost step by step how and on what grounds proposals were eliminated from the 1967 legislative package. While Cannon's analysis undoubtedly set some implicit limits on the size and feasiblity of the higher education proposals, it is important to note that <u>explicit</u> references to cost figured infrequently in the discussions (as far as can be determined from meeting notes).

The BOB's initial objections to the computer proposal were overcome when the Office of Science and Technology and the National Science Foundation, both of which had been exploring the idea, supplied the missing factual justification. OST's Donald Hornig and Commissioner Howe repeatedly argued for the program's inclusion on grounds that computers were "essential" to any "basic" education. William Gorham of HEW opposed the

measure as inappropriate when there was still much to do in the realm of providing higher education opportunities for the poor. President Johnson, however, found the idea to his liking and included it in his 1967 Message on Education and Health.

Little attention was given to the Task Force's proposal to include grants for the arts and humanities until the December meetings. The question here was not whether but how much money ought to be appropriated for the program: HEW wanted double what the BOB was willing to allow. Except for this aspect of the proposal, consensus was easily reached. The same can be said of the basic concept behind the proposed regional higher education centers. Agreement was quick to come after it was decided that the path of least resistance in Congress would be to expand the mission of the elementary and secondary labs rather than seek separate authorization. However, sometime between December 10th, when draft #3 of the 1967 education program was prepared,[14] and January 12, 1967, when a copy of legislative packaging arrangements for the 1967 program was approved by HEW Under Secretary Cohen,[15] this proposal disappeared.

The November-December hearings on the fourth title of the proposed Higher Education Quality Act stand in stark contrast to those of the other three. Opinions on the undergraduate teaching improvement program were sharply divided. On the one hand, pressing for inclusion, was White House aide Douglass Cater. On the other hand was Wilbur Cohen. Poised somewhere between were Howe, Cannon, Gardner, Hornig, and the others. While all acknowledged that the nation's middle-range colleges stood in dire need of qualitative and organizational improvements, no two could agree on how to tackle the problem without antagonizing both those the program would exclude and those the program was intended to serve. As one among the group pointed out, the program did not include community colleges, and "any higher education program must do so." Gardner wanted to exclude the better state universities, which he felt were not properly middle-range colleges. Even if it were possible to draw "firm" and acceptable lines of eligibility, which some doubted, there was ample evidence that the higher education community would continue to press for general aid and would oppose "another" program offering project grants.

Two alternatives to the Task Force's proposal were explored, including Cater's proposal for aid based on institutional "development plans" and on the number of federally supported students enrolled (which all readily acknowledged to be a "vehicle for getting unrestricted grants into colleges") and a Gardner-Howe proposal for categorical grants "based on institutional plans for achieving excellence." But neither of these seemed to be the solution the group was seeking. At the December 10th meeting, Cohen voiced his belief that it would be "very dangerous to go with /a middle-range college program/ this year," a statement made in the context of academic opposition to project grants of any nature. Realizing that time was running out as well, the group unanimously decided to commit the middle-range college and institutional support questions to the newly appointed Friday Task Force.

On this note of deferral, the White House-Task Force deliberations on the 1967 higher education program ended. Thus, of the Task Force's four major proposals for improving the quality of higher education, only two survived the last days leading up to the preparation of the President's Message on Education and Health. To an extent, fiscal constraints were to blame for the scaling-down of the legislative agenda. The decision to abandon a program to promote greater opportunity for higher education, for example, was at least partially based on budgetary considerations.[16] But it was the thicket of dilemna confronting the Task Force and the White House -- and, perhaps, the ready reason to defer decision offered by the creation of the Friday Task Force -- that led to the loss of the centerpiece proposal for higher education.

## The 1966 Friday Task Force and The 1967 Gardner-Howe Interagency Task Force

It had been two years, when the Friday Task Force was appointed, since the Administration had asked an outside group to take a look at the whole of education. After the 1964 Gardner Task Force, the White House had relied on interagency committees for this sort of analysis. Two outside education task forces were appointed during 1965-66, but their missions were narrowly drawn and required expertise then not found in large or concentrated measure

within the Executive Branch. The 1965 and 1966 Interagency Task Forces had demonstrated that policy for a wide range of educational enterprises could be formulated using Executive Branch resources. Why the White House felt it was time to invite an outside group to undertake this task begs for explanation, particularly when one recalls that the Johnson advisory groups operated in secret and, therefore, offered none of the "public education" advantages associated with public advisory groups.

There are several partial answers to this question, some intuitively derived, some provided by the Johnson archives. First, plans for the Friday Task Force coincided with mid-term in the Johnson Administration. Much had been accomplished in education, but all recognized that there was more that could be done to meet old obligations and new expectations. The creation of an outside task force, comprised of men with their hands on the pulse of these demands, could, perhaps, give the White House a reliable, private reading in preparation for the second half of the term -- and for a second term.

Second, there is no doubt, regardless of motives, that most of the White House aides dealing with education felt they had as much at stake in seeing expectations or obligations met as those in HEW. (This is not to say, of course, that White House and HEW perceptions and priorities were the same.) As Wilbur Cohen has remarked, Califano and Gaither continually pressed HEW for new legislative ideas.[1] It may well be that the White House believed that innovative thinking at the agency level needed a "booster shot." Certainly, the good taste left on White House palates after the 1964 Gardner Task Force would have left most well-disposed to the idea.

There is reason to believe that the White House was not only interested in obtaining a fresh look at American education from the Friday Task Force but was also interested in having the Task Force "validate" White House ideas and impulses on education. The idea for the Friday Task Force originated around the same time the White House decided to appoint the Gardner-Howe Interagency Task Force. Recommendations for creating both were in Gaither's 1967 legislative program binder. As with the Interagency Task Force, the White House compiled

a fairly detailed agenda for the Friday group, an agenda containing some issues considered by the Interagency group in the fall of 1966 as well as others.[2] While it is certain that a number of these program ideas were generated at the agency level, Gaither also had a hand in drafting them.[3] The agenda, which Howe presented to the Task Force at its first meeting,[4] instructed the Task Force to determine whether unrestricted grants to institutions would improve the overall quality of education, whether categorical grants could encourage innovation and diversity in programs and institutions, whether the federal government ought to do more to meet institutional needs for faculty and staff, and whether there ought to be some sort of comprehensive planning for the nation as a whole. As this sample of issues suggests, the White House had a definite course in mind for the Task Force.

The President approved a list of Task Force nominees recommended by Gardner, Cater, Cannon, and Sargent Shriver on September 30, 1966. His only comment was "no press leaks."[5] The nominees included Sidney Marland, Superintendent of Pittsburgh schools, for chairman; William Friday, President of the University of North Carolina, for vice chairman (these designations were later reversed); David Bell of the Ford Foundation; Lee DuBridge, President of Cal Tech; Hugh Calkins of the Cleveland Board of Education; J.W. Edgar, Texas State Superintendent of Public Instruction; John Fischer, President of Columbia's Teachers College; Fred Harrington, President of the University of Wisconsin; Alexander Heard, Chancellor of Vanderbilt University; Edward Levi, Provost of the University of Chicago; Rev. Walter Ong of Washington University; David Reisman, Harvard University sociologist; John Goodlad of UCLA; and Leon Sullivan of the Opportunities Industrial Council in Philadelphia.

Reisman did not serve on the Task Force; Thomas Pettigrew, a "reconstructed Southerner" and also a Harvard sociologist, was selected as his replacement. Apparently, Goodlad served the Task Force as a consultant. Leon Sullivan's nomination sparked some controversey and his name was dropped after the Task Force's first meeting.[6] Samuel Brownell, a member of the 1956 Josephs Committee, a former Superintendent of Detroit public schools, and a consultant to Yale, was belatedly asked to serve after Marland persuaded Gardner "that another school man should be added to

the Task Force" because it was "top heavy with higher education people."[7]

At its first meeting on November 22nd, the Task Force was advised "not to impose any particular political or budgetary constraints on its deliberations"[8] -- counsel which it freely heeded over the next several months. After Howe had discussed major shortcomings and oversights in federal education programs, Task Force members added their own observations, most in the form of criticism.[9] Harrington discoursed at some length on the need for "institutional support of universities as a partner of categorical support." DuBridge argued that the federal government "talks of supporting higher education but mostly buys services." These first meeting comments foreshadowed themes that were to dominate months of debate.

In early January, Task Force members sent Friday and Cannon their own appraisals of federal policy and education problems.[10] General support of higher education, support of humanistic and scientific studies and scholarship , and the fate of Negro colleges were among the "absolute musts" members wanted to see the Task Force tackle. Clearly anticipating the preeminence of the institutional support question, Cannon and Friday asked John Morse of the ACE for a memorandum discussing the pros and cons of institutional aid alternatives shortly after the November meeting.[11] Morse's paper was but the first in a long line of papers on this and other subjects that were read by the Task Force.

Predictably, the first higher education topic discussed at the January meeting was the financing of instruction, research, and general capital needs.[12] Someone raised the point that private universities, as an "instrument of national purpose," should be given "disproportionate Federal support for the sake of their maintenance." By the February meeting, this point had become principle, with the Task Force agreeing that "special attention must be focused on the need to sustain the private universities." There was no agreement, however, on "the manner" of aid to higher education.[13]

Largely as a result of the deft leadership of Sidney Marland, the Task Force moved quickly over elementary and secondary terrain. The higher education stalemate continued well into the spring. In March, the Task Force had

agreed only that none of the Office of Education's alternative financing schemes was adequate.[14] In one fell swoop, though not without dissent, the members rejected seven OE proposals for aid to institutions.

With their reporting date only two months away, the members assembled in April to review a preliminary draft of the Task Force report prepared by Cannon on April 7th.[15] During the review, commitments appeared to crystallize: the Task Force would propose no general aid to elementary and secondary education "at this time," would emphasize programs for the racial and economic integration of public schools, and would recommend "basic conditional aid for universities" along with new and conventional categorical programs.[16] However, as subsequent report drafts and other documents betray, there were still strong misgivings on the part of some Task Force members with respect to the basic aid question. On June 2nd, David Bell wrote to his colleagues arguing for a "more fully reasoned alternative" to the Harrington proposal for institutional support payments based on equal amounts per student and the DuBridge proposal to pay institutions a fixed percentage of instructional costs.[17] Bell's alternative was strictly categorical, well-argued, but not persuasive enough to deter those who wanted some form of institutional assistance. The debate persisted into the middle of June when a second draft of the report was circulated.[18] By June 29th, the question had been resolved by compromise. The final draft of the report recommended unrestricted grants to institutions equal to 10% of instructional costs plus $100 per student -- an approach the Task Force hoped "would satisfy the needs of both public and private universities."[19]

There is no doubt that one of the major catalysts behind the institutional support compromise was the Task Force's long-awaited receipt of William Bowen's study of "The Economics of the Major Private Universities" sometime after discussion of the April 7th draft.[20] Projecting a deficit of $20-28 million for a "typical" major private university for the year 1975-76, Bowen concluded that "serious consideration" should be given "to introducing a program of institutional grants."[21] He also concluded that federal categorical programs should be expanded and improved, that "top priority" be given to expanding fellowship programs and cost of education grants, and that an educational opportunity bank for students be considered

along with supplemental grants to institutions for scholarships.

The Bowen study was consonant with many of the Friday recommendations. As its first priority, the Task Force proposed a four-part program of basic aid, including (1) unrestricted grants, (2) a larger federal share of matching grants for academic facilities and increased authorizations for construction programs, (3) expanded federal support of graduate programs, creation of a Social Science Foundation, and full-cost payments for federally-supported research, and (4) raising the number of federally-supported graduate students to 50% of the total enrollment and raising cost of education allowances from $2,500 to $3,500 per student. Its second priority was improving undergraduate instruction. Many of the Task Force's recommendations followed those formulated by the 1966 Interagency Task Force, including project grants to develop better college curricula, to stimulate innovation in teaching, to allow undergraduate faculty to do research, to establish undergraduate teaching professorships, and to establish supplementary centers to encourage curricular and instructional innovation. Concern for the plight of Negro colleges was translated into a proposal to encourage developing colleges and well-established institutions to share facilities, faculty, and programs. Fourth on the Task Force's list of priorities was the expansion of student aid programs and compensatory programs for disadvantaged college youth. These proposals were followed by programs for strengthening the community service functions of universities and renovating teacher education.

By 1971, the total price tag for these proposals would be $4 billion at the funding levels recommended by the Task Force. When added to the 1971 cost of its "moon shot" programs to eliminate discrepancies in the quality of public elementary and secondary education and to the cost of proposals for planning and evaluation, the Friday recommendations would require $9 billion above 1968 outlays.[22]

Despite the obvious budget problems these staggering figures posed, Commissioner Howe found so much to commend in the report that he urged a break with the Administration's policy of task force secrecy. Within a week of receiving the report, and without first consulting Gardner, Howe wrote Cater asking him to "advise the President to make the report

of the Task Force . . . a public document."[23] The report, in Howe's opinion, was "statesmanlike" and could, if released, provide the President the arms he would need to fend off Congressional proposals for "Quie Amendments" and "tax-sharing, block-grant schemes advanced by the Republican Party." The report had utility in the next session of Congress and beyond; the President would

> have some very useful options to select from . . . without buying the whole package. He could at the same time develop a position for launching a general aid program alongside major categorical efforts . . . .

Howe went on to argue that the report "for the first time puts the Federal Government in a truly responsible position in regard to higher education" and that it could be the basis for "helping" higher education rather than merely "using" it.

When Howe's proposal was advanced to the President, the decision was made to release only a modified version of the Task Force's statement on general aid to elementary and secondary education.[24] At the same time this "leak" was being engineered, requests for the Harrington and Bowen papers used by the Task Force in drawing up its basic aid proposals arrived from top foundation and association people. Cater and Gaither urged Califano to release these materials after deleting specific proposals adopted by the Task Force.[25] They reasoned that it would make little sense to refuse the requests since the "existence of these papers is widely known in academic circles" and "withholding . . . such pioneering efforts . . . is difficult to justify." Califano disagreed.

As 1968 program ideas were being assembled over the summer, Cannon, Gaither, and Califano decided that it was necessary to form a "high level Task Force to review the major recommendations of the /Friday/ Task Force" and that "less important recommendations" would be staffed out to the agencies.[26] When Califano sent notice of this decision to Gardner, he asked Gardner whether he agreed with the White House's distinction between major and minor proposals. For higher education major proposals included the four-part "basic aid" package, the proposal for compensatory services to disadvantaged college youth, and the program to foster "combinations of white and non-white institutions." Gardner recommended only one small

change, which Califano accepted.[27]

That the White House felt it necessary to delete all "reference to the origin of the ideas and recommendations" contained in its memo chartering the 1967 follow-up Task Force[28] strongly suggests that the major Friday proposals had at least one well-placed skeptic or someone fearful of raising hopes in the education community. The decision to restrict the 1967 Interagency Task Force to use of a paraphrased summary of the major proposals angered Task Force members.[29] As Gaither reported to Califano, the early September meetings of the in-house group were characterized by "outright criticism bordering on contempt for the . . . policy." Both Gaither and Fred Bohen asked Califano to reverse his stand, arguing that "it is indefensible to . . . hold the /Task Force/ product so tightly that it has no fertilizing effect at the top of the Administration." They also warned that "the increasing hostility within the government (including Executive Office agencies) to the whole task force enterprise" would lead interagency groups to "give the ideas of outside groups very short shrift."

But there is little evidence that the 1967 Interagency Task Force gave deliberate, short shrift to the Friday proposals, in spite of Howe's complaint that the Task Force needed more time than Califano would allow for review.[30] By late September, discussion papers or pricing charts had been prepared on a number of the Friday proposals, including basic institutional aid, undergraduate education, and graduate education and research.[31] By early October, preliminary positions had been forged,[32] and by October 23rd, the Task Force report was ready for White House review.[33]

The report itself contained no provisions for basic institutional aid, recommending instead that a Presidential commission be set up to study the question in the larger context of existing categorical aid and student aid. However, in his memo transmitting the report to Califano, Howe pointed out that a minority of the Task Force "favors having the President suggest new legislation in the next session of Congress to provide general aid to higher education" based on the Friday recommendations.[34] A week after receiving the memo and report, Califano called a meeting in his office to discuss aid to higher education. Present were Gardner, Cater, Gaither, Schultze, and Howe. A few hours after the meeting had ended, Califano sent the President

a memo stating that he had instructed How to "devote most of his time during the next two months" to devising a "program of basic aid to higher education."[35] Such a program, he told the President, would solve "the only major educational problem which cannot be solved by legislation you have already proposed and enacted." Once in place, he added, "your record of support for education will be complete and unparalleled in human history."

Not all shared Califano's vision. When the news was announced at a November 8th meeting to discuss other recommendations of the in-house Task Force, ripples of resistance promptly surfaced at the agency level. HEW Assistant Secretary William Gorham wrote Gardner a detailed letter opposing the proposal on several grounds.[36] Speaking for Cohen as well, Gorham argued that, politically, a "program of general stringless institutional support" would be "a serious error" when "the Great Society programs of 1965-1966 are underfunded, some would say grossly underfunded." Even if funds were available, he continued, "institutional aid . . . would be a low-priority program, perhaps even an undesirable program" because its benefits would ultimately and only accrue to the middle- and upper-income groups. Moreover, institutional grants merely "give all colleges and universities a little bit more free cash," and while such a program "might save some small mediocre colleges from extinction," it would hardly provide "a base for building high-quality institutions." Having thus vented his spleen, Gorham sent a "personal and confidential" copy of his memo to Gaither,[37] presumably in the hope that Gaither would take up the issue privately with Califano.

While Howe was working behind the scenes on the basic aid question, the Task Force and White House aides continued to meet through November and into December to review other proposals.[38] The 1966 proposal to step up the Upward Bound program and enlarge its "target group," also endorsed by the Friday Task Force, was accorded high legislative priority. The outside and interagency proposals for increasing financial aid to students, and to improve R&D in undergraduate education were also deemed desirable, "but doubt /was/ expressed /as to/ whether the Budget would permit more than a modest expansion" of these programs. The same doubt was expressed with respect to the proposal to assist the disadvantaged to "enter and complete

graduate and professional school" but, later, Califano confidentially instructed the BOB to "insure that the Budget contains sufficient funds" for this proposal.[39] Review of the Interagency Task Force proposals for graduate education also produced mixed results. The Interagency Task Force opposed the Friday recommendation for a Social Science Foundation, and the proposal was accordingly dropped. Increased funding for the arts and humanities was approved, however. Decision on whether to have the federal government support 50% of enrolled graduate students, as the Friday Task Force had urged, was deferred until the basic aid dilemna was resolved, though it was agreed that the cost of education allowance on fellowships should be raised to $3,500. The Friday Task Force's recommendation to expand institutional support, rather than project support, of graduate schools was endorsed by the Interagency Task Force and the White House. The BOB was instructed to determine how this shift in emphasis could be reflected in the FY '69 budget.

When Howe sent up detailed analyses of the 1968 higher education legislation package on December 5th and 6th,[40] he sent them without any proposal for basic institutional aid. In both of his transmittal memos to Califano, he reiterated his reservations, stating on the 5th that "I personally cannot see a desirable recommendation at this point," and on the 6th that "I don't think that a general aid program of the Friday type should be proposed now. Neither do John Gardner, Charlie Schultze, and Clark Kerr." He promised, nonetheless, to present his views on what might be "the most viable" approach to such a program.

Accordingly, on the 7th, and again voicing his concern, Howe sent Califano his "view of the possibilities."[41] These included the Friday proposal, a variation on the Friday proposal that would substitute faculty salary cost allowances for instructional cost allowances, a flat per capita grant proposal (i.e., without instructional or faculty salary allowances), and a variable grants per student proposal that would pay institutions $100 per freshman and sophomore, $200 per junior and senior, and $400 per graduate student enrolled. Howe threw what support he could muster behind the fourth alternative, concluding that it would be the easiest to administer and the most likely to win academic acceptance.

In an "Eyes Only" memo to Gardner a few days later, Califano asked the Secretary to review the Howe paper and a detailed plan for institutional aid based on the Friday proposal (which either Califano or Gaither drew up) and to be ready to discuss both in Califano's office on December 13th.[42] The original Friday scheme for grants of $100 per student plus 10% of instructional costs was halved in the new plan, and while "planning" would begin in FY '69, no grants would be made until FY '71. Evidently, the only decision reached at the December 13th meeting was to narrow the field of alternatives, for at the December 20th meeting the modified Friday plan was the only alternative to appear on the agenda.[43] On that day, Gardner, Howe, and Schultze prevailed: there would be "no legislative proposal on general aid," just a statement in the President's Message to Congress instructing the Secretary of HEW to develop a comprehensive strategy for federal aid to higher education.[44]

Had the Administration decided to go with the Friday basic aid program, the decision would have marked an important departure from the traditional scope of federal aid to higher education. Instead, the issue was turned over to HEW's Alice Rivlin for further study. The results of the "Rivlin Report" are widely known. In essence, the study concluded that federal priority should be given to promoting equality of educational opportunity and supporting graduate education and research.[45] While the report did not rule out institutional support (the Rivlin committee specifically reviewed the Friday proposals), it was unequivocal in placing aid to students above aid to institutions. The Rivlin Report, of course, was not the last word heard on the matter. The higher education interests groups presented their own proposals for basic aid to Congress as a ballast to counter-balance proposals for student aid in 1972. When the wrangling over the 1972 Higher Education Amendments came to an end, they had fared no better than Califano had in 1967.

While the Friday Task Force was not to see its proposal for institutional aid enacted, its report nonetheless served to stimulate serious and sustained debate both inside and outside official policy-making circles. The Task Force saw more immediate and tangible results as well. Nine of its higher education proposals were incorporated -- some more faithfully than others -- in the

1968 Higher Education Amendments. Among the more noteworthy of these were its proposals for grants to strengthen graduate education, increases in the cost of education allowances and length of graduate fellowships, additional funds for developing colleges, compensatory services for disadvantaged students, and expansion of the community service functions of universities.

## Conclusions

Perhaps the safest generalization that can be drawn from these six examples of ad hoc policy formulation is one borrowed from Stephen Bailey: they are "long on uniquities, short on ubiquities." At the risk, however, of venturing farther than sample size and prudence allow, the author offers a few tentative observations that may later prove to be characteristic of Presidential policy formulation at the ad hoc or other levels.

First, White House response to the recommendations of the higher education advisory groups was often at odds with BOB and agency response. This came as no surprise here and seems likely to be found to be the case elsewhere. The reason appears to be that while the White House, the BOB, and agencies serve the same several masters, they serve them in vastly different degrees. To an extent, all three are hostage to the need to satisfy political demands, to evaluate legislative proposals against one another in terms of their "fit" with the overriding thrust of domestic programs, and to do both of these within specific time and budgetary constraints. But of the three, the White House is, undoubtedly, on the shortest leash. For the Truman White House, the Zook proposals were like many other domestic program proposals that could not be purchased at the price of a foreign or defense policy objective. For the Eisenhower White House, an outright endorsement of the Josephs report, it was thought, would have alienated political friends and strengthened the cause among political foes. For the Kennedy White House, placing grants for construction above scholarships for students would have betrayed a campaign commitment. By the mid-sixties, the Johnson White House was faced with the same domestic versus defense spending dilemna the Truman Administration faced in the late forties and early fifties.

Second, while the presence or absence of White House support for a legislative program proposal is among the most important factors affecting

its chances for enactment, the Josephs and Hovde studies show that it is not always the determining factor. In the case of the former, the White House was reluctant to embark upon a large-scale program of federal aid to higher education, mainly because it feared that there could be no such thing as temporary assistance. But the public mood and pressure from a well-armed Secretary of HEW prevailed. Similar forces prompted the Kennedy Administration to accept a construction grants proposal. Congress and interest groups simply persisted in their support for a Hovde-type program.

Third, it has been observed elsewhere that the creation of an ad hoc advisory group is a sign of White House proclivity to act on a given issue. The six cases studied here suggest a refinement of this observation. The appointment of a commission or task force is not always a sign that the President wants to act. As in the cases of the Zook and Josephs Commissions, the impulse to create these groups came from persons who had personal and professional interests in higher education and who could command the President's ear. In both instances, the President was not predisposed to enlarging federal responsibility for higher education but had to be persuaded that such was a course worth considering -- or that the consequences of ignoring such a course would be worse than the consequences of studying it.

Last remarks are reserved for those more interested in "uniquities" than "ubiquities." The specific historical value of this study is twofold. First, the study's findings challenge long-held notions that the post-war commissions had little, if any, impact on the Administrations they served. Both the Zook and the Josephs Commissions provided fodder for Presidential proposals to Congress. The Zook Commission's student aid proposals occupied the attention of the Office of Education for nearly two years and gained the support of BOB and White House staff. For years, scholars have suggested that without Sputnik, the Eisenhower Administration would not have produced its NDEA proposals. While there is no doubt that Sputnik silenced or at least muffled opposition to federal aid, there is also no doubt that plans for a program were under way four months before the Soviet surprise. The question is not whether, absent Sputnik, there would have been an Administration program but whether, absent the enterprising Folsom, his OE associates, and the Josephs report, there would have been an Administration program.

Second, this study offers the first close look at the 1960, 1966, and 1967 secret task forces. Its findings show that the Hovde Task Force's recommendations for higher education were, by and large, embraced by the Kennedy Administration -- some on their instant merit and some out of necessity. The 1966 Gardner-Howe Interagency Task Force had but modest success in the higher education arena. Its innovative proposals to improve undergraduate education foundered on political and budgetary shoals. The proposals of the Friday Task Force for institutional aid, which grappled head-on with the problems the 1966 Task Force was reluctant to address outright, likewise foundered, though a number of its less important higher education recommendations became law. The legacy of the 1967 Gardner-Howe Interagency Task Force was, in effect, to cast doubt on the Friday Task Force's faith in the reforming and redistributive powers of federal aid to education.

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### Introduction

[1] Samples of Norman C. Thomas's work on the subject include: Thomas E. Cronin and Norman C. Thomas, "Educational Policy Advisors and the Great Society," Public Policy (Fall 1970), pp. 659-86; Norman C. Thomas and Harold Wolman, "The Presidency and Policy Formulation: The Task Force Device," Public Administration Review 29 (September/October 1969): 459-70.

[2] David Henry, Challenges Past, Challenges Present (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), pp. 69-84.

[3] Robert Eugene Hawkinson, "Presidential Policy Formulation in Education: Lyndon Johnson and the 89th Congress" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1977).

### The 1946 Zook Commission

[1] Interview with Earl J. McGrath, 11/8/82.

[2] Interview with McGrath, 11/8/82.

[3] Letter to the author from John L. Thurston, 11/9/82.

[4] For discussions of the liberal and conservative advisors in the Truman White House see: Alonzo Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971), p. 295; Patrick O. Anderson, The President's Men (New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 93-4; J. Joseph Huthmacher, The Truman Years: The Reconstruction of Postwar America (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1972), p. 7; the direct quote is taken from Susan M. Hartman, Truman and the 80th Congress (Columbia, Mo.: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1971), p. 199.

[5] Edward S. Flash, Jr., Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisers (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1965), p. 97.

[6] Letter to the author from John L. Thurston, 11/30/82.

[7] Memo, Donald Kingsley to John R. Steelman, 7/9/46, White House Central Files, OF 1060, Folder "1060(1945-July 1946)," Harry S. Truman Library. (Hereafter the White House Central Files will be abbreviated as WHCF.)

[8] Ibid.; Thurston's letter to the author of 11/30/82 points out that Kingsley checked Zook Commission nominees with his own contacts in the field.

[9] Responses to the Commission announcement are contained in WHCF OF 1060, Folder "Miscellaneous."

[10] Letter, Eleanor Roosevelt to the President, 2/11/47, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060(Aug. 1946-53)."

[11] Telegram, Ralph McDonald to the President, 7/18/46, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060(1945-July 1946)."

[12] Memo, Kingsley to Steelman, 7/18/46, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060 (1945-July 1946)."

[13] Interview with McGrath, 11/8/82 and Thurston letter, 11/30/82.

[14] Thurston letter, 11/9/82.

[15] Memo, Kingsley to Steelman, 7/9/46, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060 (1945-July 1946)."

[16] Memo, George Zook to Steelman, 8/8/46 and Memo, Steelman to Zook, 8/15/46, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060(Aug. 1946-53)"; "Minutes First Meeting of the Inter-Agency Committee," 10/7/46, RG 130, Folder "President's Commission on Higher Education"; "Progress Report" attached to Memo, Zook to Steelman, 4/10/47, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060(Aug. 1946-53)."

[17] Memo, Kingsley to Steelman, 11/8/46 and Memo, Zook to Steelman, 4/10/47, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060(Aug. 1946-53)."

[18] "Progress Report" attached to Memo, Zook to Steelman, 4/10/47, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060(Aug. 1946-53)."

[19] Letter, Horace Kallen to T. R. McConnell et al, 1/24/47, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060(Aug. 1946-53)."

[20] "Progress Report" attached to Memo, Zook to Steelman, 4/10/47, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "1060(Aug. 1946-53)."

[21] Letter, Watson B. Miller to the President, 1/9/47, WHCF, OF Box 1261, Folder "419-F Message to Congress" and Memo, Clark Clifford to Miller, 1/27/47, in same file and folder.

[22] Memo to File, Frank Pace, 9/2/48, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "Miscellaneous."

[23] Letter, Steelman to Seymour Smith, 4/10/48, WHCF, OF 1060, Folder "Miscellaneous."

[24] See "Office of Education Report on the Community College," 6/30/50, Papers of Ralph M. Flynt, Box 25, Folder "Office of Education Report on the Community College."

[25] See "1949 Addresses, Articles, Statements, Letters, and Forewords" of Earl J. McGrath, Microfilm Collection, Papers of Earl J. McGrath, 1949-53 and "Speech and Article" files of John Dale Russell, Papers of John Dale Russell, Boxes 9, 10, 12, 13. See also "US Plan Would Aid College Students," The New York Times, 10/19/49, 27:5.

[26] Formulation of the Administration's Student Aid Bill from 1948-50 is reconstructed from documents contained in the Papers of George M. Elsey, Folder "Legislation-81st Congress 2nd Session-Education." See in particular: "Some Issues Involved in the Grant-in-aid vs Direct Federal Operation of a Scholarship Program," 11/22/49 (with attached notes); Memo, I.M. Labovitz and Emery Wine to Elmer Staats, 11/18/49, re: Summary of Meeting with the Office of Education Staff; Memo, Staats to Weldon Jones, 12/15/49, re: Aid to Higher Education; Memo with attachments, R.E. Neustadt to George Elsey, 4/21/50, re: Scholarship-Fellowship-Loan Program.

[27] Letter to the author from Rufus E. Milles, 10/13/82.

[28] Thurston letter, 11/9/82.

The 1956 Josephs Committee

[1] Memo, Samuel Brownell to Bernard Stanley, undated but circa 4/24/56, WHCF, OF Box 900, Folder "OF 236-A-2 (1) /2/," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

[2] Memo, Marion B. Folsom to Sherman Adams, 2/3/56, WHCF, OF Box 900, Folder "OF 236-A-2 (1) /2/."

[3] "Report on the first two meetings of the Committee on Education Beyond the High School," WHCF, OF Box 900, Folder "236-A-2."

[4] "First Interim Report to the President," 11/20/56, WHCF, OF Box 600, Folder "236-A-2 (2)."

[5] "Notes of Legislative Meeting," 12/31/56, Legislative Meeting Series, Ann Whitman Files, Folder "Legislative Meetings 1956 (5) December." (Hereafter Ann Whitman Files will be abbreviated as AWF.)

[6] Letter, Gerald Ebers to General Andrew Goodpastor, 7/8/57, WHCF, OF Box 901, Folder "236-A-2 (3)."

[7] Memo, Howard Pyle to Goodpastor, 1/20/57, WHCF, OF Box 901, Folder "236-A-2 (3)."

[8] For the letter finally sent to the Josephs Committee, Folsom's draft letter, and White House response to the Folsom draft, see Letter with attachments, The President to Devereux Josephs, 8/19/57, WHCF, OF Box 901, Folder "236-A-2."

[9] Letter, Josephs to the President, 10/21/57, WHCF, OF Box 901, Folder "236-A-2 (3)."

[10] Memo, Folsom to the President, 10/23/57, Administration Series, Box 16, Folder "Folsom, Marion B. (1)."

[11] "Memorandum of Conference with the President," DDE Diary Series, AWF, Box 30, Folder "Nov. '57 Staff Notes."

[12] See draft of "Educational Development Act," 11/12/57, WHCF, OF Box 545, Folder "111-C 1957."

[13] "Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of November 15, 1957," Cabinet Series, AWF, Box 10, Folder "Cabinet Meeting of November 15, 1957."

[14] "Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of December 2, 1957," Cabinet Series, AWF, Box 10, Folder "Cabinet Meeting of December 2, 1957."

[15] "Notes on Legislative Leadership Meeting December 4, 1957," Legislative Meeting Series, AWF, Box 2, Folder "Legislative Meetings 1957 (5)."

[16] Memo with attachments, R.W. Jones, Office of Legislative Clearance, to the Director /BOB/, 11/22/57, Papers of Bryce N. Harlow, Box 12, Folder "Legislative Items for 1958 and 1959."

[17] Memo with attachments, Folsom to the President, 12/27/57, WHCF, OF Box 545, Folder "111-C 1957."

[18] "Memorandum on Education" by MSE /Milton S. Eisenhower/, 1/3/58, DDE Diary Series, AWF, Box 30, Folder "Staff Notes, Jan. 1958."

[19] See OE study with attached statement, "Financial Aid to College and University Students," 5/31/57, Papers of Ralph C. Flynt, Box "Financial Aid to College and University Students May 31, 1957 Statement-Report," Folder "Folder 2," Harry S. Truman Library.

[20] An outline of the Administration's debt-retirement bill is contained in Records of Wilton B. Persons, Box 1, Folder "HEW File."

[21] James Sundquist, Politics and Policy: the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968), P. 196.

The 1960 Hovde Task Force

[1] Memo, Richard Neustadt to JFK, 10/30/60, Papers of Theodore Sorensen, Box 18, Subject Files 1953-60, Folder "Transition Correspondence and Memos 10/30/60-12/30/60." John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library.

[2] Memo, Lawrence O'Brien to Sorensen, 11/30/60, Papers of Sorensen, Box 18, Subject Files 1953-60, Folder "Transition Correspondence and Memos 10/30/60-12/30/60."

[3] Letter, Frederick Hovde to Sorensen, 1/2/61, Pre-Presidential Papers, Box 1071, Folder "Education Task Force Report."

[4] Appendix II of the Report of the Task Force on Education, "Detailed Recommendations for Presidential Staff Use," 1/2/61, Pre-Presidential Papers, Box 1071, Folder "Education Task Force Report."

[5] A summary of the task force report review process is found in Memo, Special Counsel to the President-Elect, 12/13/60, Papers of Sorensen, Box 18, Folder "Transition Correspondence and Memos 10/30/60-12/30/60."

[6] Interview with Wilbur J. Cohen, 1/11/83.

[7] Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 237.

[8] Interview with Cohen, 1/11/83.

[9] Interview with Cohen, 1/11/83.

[10] See, for example, an ACE report sent to Sorensen by Russell Thackery on 2/9/61 in White House Central Subject Files, Box 92 "Education," Folder "Education 1/1/61-2/28/61." For the BOB discussion see "Specific Issues Relating to Aid to Higher Education," approved by BOB Director Stans 1/4/61, Papers of Sorensen, Box 61, Folder "Education Message 11/60-1/26/61."

[11] See Congressional Quarterly Almanac: 1961, 17:244-46, and a draft of Kennedy's bill sent by Cohen to Myer Feldman on 3/6/61 and then on to Kennedy by Feldman on 3/7/61 in White House Staff Files, Myer Feldman File, Box 27, Folder "Higher Education 3/61."

[12] Memo with attachments, Cohen to General Counsel Alanson Wilcox, 2/8/61 and "Treatment of Church-State and Discrimination Issues in . . . Higher Education Construction Proposals," 2/8/61, both in Papers of Sorensen, Box 61, Folder "Education Message 2/7/61-2/8/61."

[13] "Summary of Proposals for Extension and Amendment of the National Defense Education Act," undated but circa 4/61, Papers of Sorensen, Box 32, Folder "Education 4/20/61." See also Congressional Quarterly Almanac: 1961, 17:235-36.

[14] "A New Package on Education," 8/3/61 and Memo, Sorensen to the President, 8/15/61, Papers of Sorensen, Box 32, Folder "Education 8/9/61-11/2/61."

[15] Sundquist, Politics and Policy, pp. 203-05.

[16] See "Annotated Index for the National Education Act of 1963," 1/23/63, White House Staff Files, Lee C. White File, Box 4 General File, Folder "Legislation/Education 1/18/63-11/5/63."

[17] Sundquist, Politics and Policy, pp. 207-09.

The 1966 Gardner-Howe Interagency Task Force

[1] "1967 Legislative Program" Binder, WHCF, Aides Files, Office Files of James Gaither, Box 219, Folder "1967 Legislative Program," The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. (Hereafter "Aides Files" will be omitted and the particular aide's file will be designated "OF James Gaither," etc.)

[2] Memo, Joseph Califano to John Gardner, 9/8/66, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 71, Folder "Task Force on Education."

[3] "Agenda" for the 9/21/66 Meeting of the 1966 Interagency Task Force on Education, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education (1)."

[4] Memo, Harold Howe to Califano, 10/10/66, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education (1)."

[5] Outlines of proposed acts contained in WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education (1)."

[6] See Memo, Califano to Gardner, 10/1/66 and Memo, Califano to Gardner, 10/10/66, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 71, Folder "Task Force on Education."

[7] Memo, Howe to Califano, 10/10/66, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education."

[8] See Report of the 1966 Interagency Task Force on Education, pp. 11-35 in the Task Force Collection, Box 13, Folder "1966 Interagency Task Force on Education."

[9] The 1966 Interagency Task Force recommended programs to add flexibility and coordination to the ESEA titles; to eliminate adult illiteracy; to expand educational TV; to strengthen vocational edcuation; to expand the Teachers Corps and to consolidate education manpower programs under one act; to promote education in economics at the secondary and college levels; to expand Upward Bound and Talent Search programs to include impoverished rural youth; and to amend and extend expiring legislation. See Task Force Collection, Box 13, Folder "1966 Interagency Task Force on Education."

[10] Memo, Howe to Califano, 10/31/66, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 71, Folder "Task Force on Education."

[11] "Task Force on Education" (list of priorities), WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 314, Folder "Task Force on Education 1966." The same list appears in OF Ervin Duggan, Box 4, Folder "1966 Task Force on Education."

[12] Memo, William Cannon to Charles Schultze, Director of the BOB, 11/7/66, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 71, Folder "Task Force on Education."

[13] Discussion of the White House, BOB, and Task Force review of the Task Force proposals from November to December is taken from notes and memos referring to four meetings. In the Task Force Collection, Box 13, Folder "1966 Interagency Task Force on Education" see (1) handwritten and typed meeting notes dated 11/14/66 for a meeting of the same date; (2) handwritten notes dated 12/5/66 for a meeting of the same date; and (3) a memo, written by Califano and sent to Howe on 11/22/66, referring to a meeting of 11/21/66. See WHCF, OF Ervin Duggan, Box 4, Folder "1966 Task Force on Education," for handwritten notes dated 12/10/66 for a meeting of the same date.

[14] "1967 Program Outline for Education, Draft #3," 12/10/66, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 346, Folder "Education."

[15] Memo with attachment outlining 1967 education program "packaging," Samuel Halperin to Cater et al, 1/12/67, WHCF, Ex Le/Ed Box 35. No mention of the higher education labs was made in the President's Education and Health Message of 2/28/67 and no record of the labs program appears in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for 1967.

[16] See p. 35 of the Task Force Report, Task Force Collection, Box 13, Folder "1966 Interagency Task Force on Education." Other factors which may have influenced the student aid program decision were stirrings in Congress for alternative approaches to student aid, including and educational opportunity bank and tax incentives. Files examined with respect to the 1966 Task Force show quite clearly that the Administration explored these alternatives as well while trying to correct problems in the guaranteed student loan program.

The 1966-67 Friday and 1967 Gardner-Howe Task Forces

[1] Interview with Cohen, 1/11/83.

[2] The development of agenda items for the Friday Task Force can be traced through the following documents: Appendix on possible directives for the Friday Task Force, sent by Gaither to Cater on 9/12/66 for a meeting with Gardner, Howe, Cannon, Cater, and Gaither on 9/13/66 attached to Memo, Cater to Gaither, 9/12/66, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 19, Folder "Correspondence Sept. 1966"; "Issues and Questions Which Might Be Considered by the Task Force on Education" sent by Howe to Gaither on 10/17/66, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education."

[3] Howe's memo of 10/17/66 (above) states that Gaither's ideas, sent to Howe earlier, were included in the 10/17/66 list of issues and questions Howe prepared.

[4] "Notes of First Meeting of President's Task Force on Education November 22, 1966," dated 12/1/66, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 351, Folder "Task Force on Education 1966."

[5] Memo, Califano to the President, 9/30/66, WHCF, Box 363, FG 600/Task Force/E, Folder "Ex FG 600/Task Force/E."

[6] Memo, Gaither to Califano, 12/6/66, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 351, Folder "Task Force on Education 1966."

[7] Ibid.

[8] "Notes of First Meeting of President's Task Force on Education November 22, 1966," dated 12/1/66, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 351, Folder "Task Force on Education 1966."

[9] Ibid.

[10] See WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education (2)" and OF James Gaither, Box 351, Folder "Task Force on Education 1966" and OF James Gaither, Box 315, Folder "Task Force on Education" (second folder).

[11] Memo, John Morse to Friday and Cannon, 12/15/66, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education (2)."

[12] "Notes on the Second Meeting of the Task Force on Education January 13 and 14, 1967," WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education (2)."

[13] "Task Force Meeting February 10 and 11, 1967," dated 2/28/67, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education (4)."

[14] "Notes on the Fourth Meeting of Task Force on Education March 17-18," dated 3/29/67, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education (4)."

[15] "Summary of Task Force on Education Report," draft dated 4/7/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 315, Folder "Task Force on Education 1966."

[16] "Notes on the Meeting of the Task Force on Education April 14 and 15, 1967," WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 37, Folder "Material on Task Force on Education (6)."

[17] Letter, David Bell to the Task Force Members, 6/2/67, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 38, Folder 9.

[18] Memo, Cannon to Members of the Task Force on Education, 6/8/67, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 38, Folder 8.

[19] Memo, Caither to Califano, 8/9/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 229, Folder "Education-Financial Aid to Higher Education #2."

[20] The April 7, 1966 draft of the Friday report noted that the Task Force was withholding judgment on aid to private universities until results of the Bowen study were received.

[21] See undated "Summary of 'The Economics of the Major Private Universities . . . .'" by William Bowen, pp. 9-11 in particular, in WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 314, Folder "Task Force on Education 1966" (second folder).

[22] See the full report of the Friday Task Force in Task Force Collection, Box 4, Folder "1966 Task Force on Education (Friday Task Force)."

[23] Memo, Howe to Cater, 7/6/67, WHCF, OF Douglass Cater, Box 20, Folder "Misc. Correspondence July-Sept. 1967."

[24] See Memo, Cannon to Cater, 7/13/67 and Memo with attachments, Duggan to the President, 8/21/67, WHCF, Box 363, Ex Fg 600 Task Forces, Folder "FG 600/Task Force/E."

[25] Memo, Gaither to Califano, 8/9/6 , WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 229, Folder "Education-Financial Aid to Higher Education #2," and Memo, Gaither to Califano, 9/15/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 351, Folder "Task Force on Education 1966."

[26] Memo, Califano to Schultze, 8/11/67, WHCF, Box 363, Ex FG 600 Task Forces, Folder "FG 600/Task Force/E," and Memo, Califano to Gardner, 8/11/67, WHCF, Box 361, Ex FG 600, Folder "Ex FG 600."

[27] Memo and attached note, Gardner to Califano, 8/14/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 189, Folder "1967-68 Task Force on Education."

[28] Memo, Fred Bohen to Califano, 8/28/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 189, Folder "1967-68 Task Force on Education."

[29] Memo, Gaither and Bohen to Califano, 8/14/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Folder "1967-68 Task Force on Education."

[30] Handwritten notes from 9/13/67 meeting of the 1967 Interagency Task Force, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 189, Folder "1967-68 Task Force on Education."

[31] See working papers and pricing charts pertaining to 1967 Interagency review of Friday and other proposals in WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 190, Folder "Task Force on Education 1967-68."

[32] See "Materials for Members of the 1968 Task Force on Education" sent by Stephen Trachtenberg to Task Force members on 10/9/67 for a Task Force meeting on 10/11/67 in WHCF, CF Box 31, Oversize Attachments.

[33] Report of the 1967 Interagency Task Force on Education, 10/23/67, Task Force Collection, Box 21, Folder "1967 Interagency Task Force on Education."

[34] Memo, Howe to Califano, 10/23/67, attached to the 1967 Interagency Report cited above.

[35] Memo, Califano to the President, 11/1/67, WHCF, Ex Ed, Box 4, Folder "Ed 8/25/67-11/17/67."

[36] Memo, William Gorham to Gardner, 11/13/67, WHCF, Ex Ed, Box 4, Folder "Ed 8/25/67-11/17/67."

[37] Copy of Gorham's memo to Gardner (above) sent to Gaither on 11/15/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 229, Folder "Education-Financial Aid to Higher Education #2" (second folder).

[38] While discussion of the Task Force proposals continued well into December, decisions on most of the higher education proposals were made at the 11/8/67 meeting of the Task Force and White House aides. See "Task Force on Education Meeting, November 8, 1967" in WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 189, Folder "1967-68 Task Force on Education."

[39] Memo, Califano to William D. Carey, 11/10/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 189, Folder "1967-68 Task Force on Education."

[40] Memo with attachments, Howe to Califano, 12/5/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 231, Folder "Strategy for Federal Aid to Higher Education."

[41] Memo with attachments, Howe to Califano, 12/7/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 227, Folder "Gaither: Higher Education."

[42] Memo with attachments, Califano to Gardner, 12/11/67, WHCF, CF Box 30, Folder "FG 165 DHEW."

[43] See Agenda for 12/20/67 meeting attached to Memo, Gaither to Califano, 12/20/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 189, Folder "1967-68 Task Force on Education."

[44] Memo, Howe to Califano, 12/21/67, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 231, Folder "Strategy for Federal Aid to Higher Education."

[45] See pp. 25-33, "Priorities and Recommendations," of the Rivlin report, WHCF, OF James Gaither, Box 227, Folder "Gaither: Higher Education."